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2003 ANNUAL SURVEY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on important cases in the field of sports law during the
period of January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003. It does not discuss every
case related to sports law during the past year, but instead provides a survey
and summary of some of the more important and more interesting decisions of
this period. The article is divided into a number of categories based on
particular focus, with some categories further sub-divided by area of law or
area of the sports field.
II. ATHLETE AGENT ISSUES
In Bauer v. Interpublic Group of Cos.,I the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California considered allegations by the plaintiff, an
athlete agent, that another sports agency firm provided plaintiffs player with
negative information about him, thus, intentionally interfering with the
contract between plaintiff and player, and therefore, inducing the eventual
termination of the player's representation agreement with the plaintiff.2 The
plaintiff, Francis G. Bauer was a registered player agent with the National
Football League Players' Association. 3 David Carr signed a representation
agreement with Bauer on January 1, 2002. 4 However, Carr terminated his
representation agreement with Bauer on January 12, 2002, 5 signing instead
with the defendants on January 22, 2002.6 Although Carr's mother told Bauer
that David Carr had recently received negative newspaper articles in the mail
prior to termination of the agreement, Carr attested that no one at Octagon
Marketing and Athlete Representation, Inc. ever commented on Bauer. 7

1. 255 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
2. Id. at 1088.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1089.

6. Bauer, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
7. Id. at 1090-92.
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To prove that the defendants had intentionally interfered with Bauer's
contract with David Carr, Bauer was required to prove: "(1) a valid contract
between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract;
(3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of
the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual
relationship; and (5) resulting damage." 8 Because Bauer could not produce
evidence that the defendants had sent the letters to David Carr, he failed to
meet his burden under the law, and summary judgment was granted in favor of
9
the defendants.
The Superior Court of Connecticut considered similar contractual issues
between athlete and agent in Lounsbury v. Camby.10 In this case, the plaintiff,
John Lounsbury, alleged that, while a student-athlete at the University of
Massachusetts, the defendant, Marcus Camby, promised to sign an exclusive
agency agreement with Lounsbury at the completion of his collegiate playing
career if Lounsbury provided him, his friends, and family with money, gifts,
and other services. 11 Camby moved to dismiss Lounsbury's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that "a dispute between a player
and his agent is subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of the
[National Basketball Players Association Regulations Governing Player
Agents]." 12 At the time of the promise, Lounsbury was not a certified agent
and, therefore, was not authorized to represent Camby in contract negotiations
with any NBA team in accordance with the NBA collective bargaining
agreement. 13 In 1996, Camby signed an exclusive representation agreement
with defendant Proserv, Inc. 14 Lounsbury alleged that Camby had breached
their oral agreement and that Proserv had tortiously interfered with that oral
agreement. 15 Had Lounsbury been a certified NBA player agent, his dispute
with Camby would have been subject to the resolution provision outlined in
section 5 of the National Basketball Association Regulations. 16 However, the
court noted that the term "agent" found within the provision referred to a
certified agent. 17 Accordingly, the court stated that there was no basis for
8. Id. at 1094 (quoting Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal. 4th 26, 55 (1998)).
9. Id. at 1095.
10. No. CV 990150580S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2273, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12,
2003).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. -1d. at* 1-2.
14. Id. at *2.
15. Lounsbury, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2273, at *2-3.
16. Id
17. Id. at *5.
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concluding that an uncertified agent, such as Lounsbury, was subject to the
same regulations. 18 In fact, it held that an uncertified agent has no legal right
to represent an NBA player in contract negotiations with any team.19 Because
Lounsbury was not subject to the NBA regulations, the court denied Camby's
20
motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, the court also considered the motion for summary judgment
of the defendant, Proserv, Inc. 2 1 In its motion, Proserv alleged that Lounsbury
could not maintain an action based on the alleged contract with Camby,
because the contract is illegal and violates public policy. 22 Proserv alleged
that the contract violated Connecticut civil and criminal law regarding athlete
agents. 23 Connecticut General Statutes § 20-555 states that an athlete shall
not:
(4) Enter into an oral or written agent contract or professional sport
services contract with an athlete before the athlete's eligibility for
collegiate athletics expires; or (5) Give, offer or promise anything of
value to an athlete, his guardian or to any member of the athlete's
immediate family before the athlete's eligibility for collegiate athletics
expires.24
However, as the court noted, the acts occurred while Camby was a student at
the University of Massachusetts, and therefore, Connecticut law would not
apply. 25 Because Connecticut law could not apply to this particular claim, a
genuine issue of material fact remained, and the court denied Proserv's motion
26
for summary judgment.
III. ANTITRUST LAW ISSUES

In Major League Baseball v. Crist,2 7 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
effect of federal antitrust law on state antitrust law matters and whether
baseball's antitrust exemption extends to the realm of investigation. 28 This
18.
19.
20.
21.
Super.

Id. at *6.
Id.
Lounsbury, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2273, at *6.
Lounsbury v. Camby, No. CV990150580S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3128, at *1 (Conn.
Ct. Nov. 13, 2003).

22. Id. at *2-3.
23. Id. at *5.
24. Id. at *5-6.

25. Id. at *8.
26. Lounsbury, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3128, at *9.
27. 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
28. Id.

606
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case arose following Major League Baseball's decision to eliminate two
teams, allegedly the Florida Marlins and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, from the
league on November 6, 2001.29 This particular case arose after Florida's
Attorney General, Robert Butterworth, issued several civil investigative
demands (CIDs) to Major League Baseball pursuant to his authority under
Florida's antitrust statute. 30 Major League Baseball challenged these CIDs,
contending that its federal exemption provided a federal right to be free of
both antitrust prosecution and investigation under either federal or state
antitrust law. 3 1 It argued that the "business of baseball" was exempt from
enforcement of an antitrust suit and investigation. 32 Furthermore, it argued
that the Attorney General's state antitrust investigation was precluded by the
exemption because state antitrust law, as applied to the business of baseball,
was preempted by federal law. 33 The court, despite its distaste for baseball's
antitrust exemption, held that, based on Supreme Court precedent and the
Supremacy Clause, contraction was clearly a matter that fell within the
"business of baseball" and, accordingly, could not be subject to federal
antitrust prosecution. 34 Additionally, the court held that because contraction
did not violate state or federal antitrust law, an investigation into the matter
35
violated Fourth Amendment protections against baseless searches.
In Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 36 the court
applied a rule of reason analysis when it permanently enjoined the NCAA
from enforcing its "Two in Four Rule." 37 In this case, the plaintiff sports
promoters sued the NCAA, alleging that the "Two in Four Rule" violated
federal antitrust law. 38 The "Two in Four Rule" was adopted in 1999, limiting
Division I college basketball teams from participating in more than two
"exempt" tournaments every four seasons. 39 For years, participation in these
"exempt" tournaments was not considered in calculating the number of each
team's regular season games, allowing teams participating in these events to
40
exceed the NCAA's maximum regular season game limit without penalty.
29. Id.at 1179.
30. Id.at 1179-80.
31. Id. at 1181.
32. Crist, 331 F.3dat 1181.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1184-86.
Id. at 1188-89.
273 F. Supp. 2d 933 (S.D. Ohio 2003).

37. Id. at 935.
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Id.
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The NCAA cited a need to limit the total number of games because of concern
for student welfare and the opportunity to allow lesser-known schools to play
in more desirable tournaments. 4 1 Since its adoption, the rule has led to a
significant decrease in the number of exempt tournament games, number of
tournaments, and in the number of basketball games scheduled by Division I
teams. 42 Additionally, in adopting the rule, the NCAA also increased the
maximum number of allowed regular season games. 43 As the number of
opportunities for lesser-known teams had actually decreased and because of an
increase in the number of regular season games, the NCAA's justifications for
the rule were not deemed as credible by the court. 44 The plaintiffs were also
successful in showing that the "Two in Four Rule" had a substantially adverse
effect on competition in the relevant product market, all Division I college
basketball games.4 5 No detailed market analysis was necessary, however, as
the plaintiffs were able to show that the restraint had significant anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction in output. 46 The restraint had clearly
reduced output in the number of exempt games and the number of
tournaments. Following this showing of significant anti-competitive effects,
the burden shifted to the NCAA to show procompetitive justifications for the
restraint. 47 The NCAA contended that the rule: "(1) further[ed] the goals of
competitive equity between large and smaller schools, (2) further[ed] the goal
of students avoiding missed class time, and (3) ma[de] a more uniform season
by stabilizing schedules and preventing an excessive number of games from
being played."'48 However, the court found these justifications unpersuasive in
balancing against the anti-competitive effects of the restraint, therefore
49
permanently enjoining the NCAA from enforcing the "Two in Four Rule."
The Sixth Circuit decided another Rule of Reason case involving player
restraints in National Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers
Hockey Club.50 Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to
violate the Sherman Antitrust Act by virtue of the "Van Ryn Rule" restraining

41.

Worldwide Basketball, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 936.

42. Id. at 935.
43. Id. at 936.

44. Id
45. Id. at 949-52.
46. Worldwide Basketball,273 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
47. Id. at 952-54.
48. Id. at 952.
49. Id. at 954-55.
50. 325 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2003).
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player movement. 5 1 The "Van Ryn Rule," adopted by the defendant Ontario
Hockey League (OHL), required any overage player signed by the league to
have been on a Canadian Hockey Association (CHA) or USA Hockey Player's
Registration Certificate during the prior season. 52 The rule "effectively
prevent[ed] OHL teams from signing any twenty-year-old U.S. colleg[iate]
hockey players." 53 The district court applied a per se analysis to this case,
54
finding that the "Van Ryn Rule" represented a per se illegal group boycott.
However, the Sixth Circuit overruled this application, noting that a rule of
reason analysis was the proper standard, as hockey leagues involve the same
types of restraints considered by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma,55 which the Court recognized as
horizontal restraints necessary for the product to exist at all. 56 Under the Rule
of Reason, however, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. The
plaintiffs did not show that the "Van Ryn Rule" resulted in antitrust injury to
the relevant market of competition for players. 57 In fact, the plaintiffs only
alleged that the rule had significant adverse impact on the player. However,
because the antitrust injury must result in anticompetitive affect on the
relevant market, plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden. 58 Accordingly,
because the lower court had failed to apply the proper antitrust standard and
because the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden under the proper rule of
reason analysis, the court reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the proper
59
standard of law.
IV. ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIP ISSUES
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently carved out an important
standard in the realm of institutional duties to scholarship athletes. In
Hendricks v. Clemson University,60 the court refused to uphold a decision
recognizing a duty of advisors to students, including student-athletes,

51. Id.

52. Id. at 715.
53. Id. at 715, n. 1.

54. Id.at 718.
55. Plymouth Whalers, 325 F.3d at 718-19 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)).
56. Id. at 718-19.
57. Id. at 720.
58. Id.at 719-21.
59. Id.at 721.
60. 578 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 2003).
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regarding negligent guidance in curriculum planning. 6 1 This particular case
involved a student-athlete at an NCAA Division II school who transferred to a
Division I university, Clemson University, and was subsequently declared
ineligible to play baseball. 62 The student's assigned academic advisor
miscalculated the total number of electives that the student could take;
consequently, the student was unable to comply with the NCAA's "Fifty
Percent" rule, making him ineligible to play baseball. 63 Hendricks then sued
Clemson for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract based
on the advisor's mistakes that caused him to become ineligible. 64 Hendricks
argued that the university affirmatively assumed a duty of care when advising
him on courses to take to maintain eligibility. 65 However, the court rejected
this position, noting that the argument did not fit into any of the causes of
action currently recognized in the state. 66 The court also viewed the
recognition of a duty flowing from advisors to students as unwise due to the
potential for a flood of litigation. 67 Because no court in South Carolina had
yet recognized the relationship between student and advisor as a fiduciary one,
the court refused to extend the definition of a fiduciary relationship in this
case. 68 Finally, although Clemson admitted that some aspects of the
student/university relationship between Hendricks and Clemson were in fact
contractual, the court noted that Hendricks had not asserted an identifiable
contractual promise that Clemson had breached in this matter. 69 It therefore
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's
70
grant of summary judgment in favor of Clemson on all causes of action.
Similarly, in Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,7 1 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered a suit brought by a high school
student and his parents against the defendant school district and its insurer
alleging negligence, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel leading to the
loss of a collegiate hockey scholarship. 72 Ryan Scott and his parents alleged
that the guidance counselor at Stevens Point Area Senior High School
61. See id
62. Id. at 712-13.
63. Id. at 713.

64. Id.
65. Hendricks, 578 S.E.2d at 714.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 715.
68. Id. at 715-16.

69. Id. at 717.
70. Hendricks, 578 S.E.2d at 717.
71. 663 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 2003).
72. Id.
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provided inaccurate information about NCAA student athlete scholarship
eligibility requirements, informing them that "Broadcast Communication" was
approved by the NCAA as fulfilling a core English requirement. 73 However,
the course did not satisfy the NCAA's core English requirement, and Scott lost
a hockey scholarship to the University of Alaska. 74 Although the guidance
counselor had provided erroneous information in a situation where accurate
information was readily available to him, the court nevertheless upheld the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. 75 The court held that providing
guidance services was inherently discretionary, not ministerial, as no statutes
requiring the district to provide counseling created an absolute or certain
duty. 76 Additionally, the breach of contract claim failed because any promise
to provide counseling to students was a promise to perform a preexisting legal
obligation, not any new obligation under contract. 77 This preexisting duty did
not become a contractual duty simply because of the plaintiffs' use of the
services. 78 Finally, the court rejected the promissory estoppel claim, viewing
it as a contravention of government immunity that would allow plaintiffs to
obtain damages from an immune government official. 79 Therefore, although
the result fails to remedy the harm suffered by the plaintiffs, the court
nonetheless affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
80
plaintiffs' complaint.
Two additional cases in Texas altered approaches typically applied to
athletic scholarships. In NCAA v. Yeo, 81 the court considered a situation in
which an intercollegiate swimmer at the University of Texas had been ruled
ineligible by the NCAA following her transfer to Texas. 82 Joscelin Yeo was a
world-class swimmer from Singapore who had competed in two Olympic
games prior to her NCAA career. 83 After transferring to the University of
Texas from the University of California at Berkeley, Yeo was not granted a
one-time waiver of the transfer rule by her previous school and was therefore
required to sit out two full semesters. 84 Cal-Berkeley was required to provide
73. Id. at 718-20.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id.at 720.
Id.
Scott, 663 N.W.2d at 721-23.
Id. at 726-28.

78. Id. at 728.
79. Id. at 728-30.
80. Id. at 730.
81.

114 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App. 2003).

82. Id. at 584-85.
83. Id. at 587-88.
84. Id. at 588.
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Yeo with a timely appeal, but instead waited until a time too late for Yeo to
85
qualify for the NCAA women's swimming and diving championship.
During the following fall, Yeo was to compete for the University of Texas and
in the Olympics. 86 Because she did not feel she could perform in her classes,
needing to devote time to the Olympic games, the Texas Athletic Department
applied for and received a waiver of the NCAA's minimum twelve credit hour
requirement. 87 After sitting out the 2000-2001 year, Yeo resumed competing
for Texas until the NCAA determined that she had not met the requirement of
two semesters in residence before returning to competition. 88 However, the
Texas Athletic Department routinely failed to inform Yeo of her ineligibility
89
and lingering eligibility questions until after hearings had been conducted.
Additionally, Yeo never received notice of the NCAA determinations in her
situation, copies of the pertinent NCAA rules, notice of her right to retain
90
counsel, or notice of the fact that her final hearing would be nonappealable.
The court found that Yeo had been denied due process in the actions of Texas
and the NCAA. 9 1 It took a unique approach to this case in finding that Yeo
had a constitutionally protected property interest in her athletic reputation as
an Olympic swimmer, which had been formed prior to her enrollment at CalBerkeley. 92 The court took care to note that its holding was limited in
application and that it did not suggest that there was a constitutionally
protected interest in extracurricular participation. 93 However, on the merits of
this particular case, the court found that Yeo had an established liberty interest
94
in her reputation as an athlete and was thus entitled to due process.
Accordingly, as a state actor, the University of Texas had an obligation to
protect that liberty interest and breached this duty in failing to provide notice
to Yeo. 95 The court accordingly affirmed the lower court's decision granting a
permanent injunction preventing the university from retroactively declaring
96
Yeo ineligible.
The Texas Court of Appeals also extended the application of an athletic
85. Id. at 588-589.
86. Yeo, 114 S.W.3d at 589.
87. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 591.
Yeo, 114 S.W.3d at 596-97.

92. Id. at 597.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 598.

95. Id. at600-01.
96. Yeo, 114 S.W.3d at 600-01.
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scholarship in other situations. 97 The court held that the "duty to pay child
support is not limited to an obligor's ability to pay from earnings, but also to
98
his ability to pay from any and all sources that may be available."
Therefore, in a case where a student-athlete received a partial athletic
scholarship paying for tuition, fees, books, and some meals, 99 the court
properly considered that scholarship in determining the monthly amount of
100
child support due.
V. COACHING ISSUES

In 2003, courts decided numerous cases in the areas of employment law
and torts involving coaches at various levels.
A. Hiringand Termination
In the past year, courts considered a number of complaints arising from
the hiring and firing of coaches at both the intercollegiate and high school
levels.
1. Intercollegiate Athletics
In a highly publicized matter, head football coach Mike Price sued the
University of Alabama following his termination for alleged inappropriate
behavior at a charity golf event. 10 1 Price claimed that his termination violated
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
because it failed to give the coach proper notice and failed to provide a
hearing. 10 2 Price had been hired as Alabama's head football coach in January,
but he had yet to sign an employment contract with the university.' 0 3
10 4
Following the allegations of inappropriate behavior at the April golf event,
and following a meeting on May 3, 2003, the Board of Trustees announced
that Price had been terminated as head football coach. 10 5 Price's request for

97. In the Interest of L.R.P., 98 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App. 2003).
98. Id.at 314.
99. Id.
100. Id.at315.
101. See Price v. Univ. of Ala., No. CV-03-CO-01790-W, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20160, at *1
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 23, 2003).
102. Id. at* 1-3.
103. Id.at*1.
104. Id.at *2.
105. Id.
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an appeal was denied, leading to this suit. 106 The court found that the
president of the university was immune from suit in his official capacity under
the Eleventh Amendment. 10 7 All individual complaints against the president
were similarly dismissed, as the actions taken by the president fell within
scope of his discretionary authority. l0 8 Additionally, the court held that Price
did not have a property interest in his head coaching position as he had never
signed an agreement with the university and that the remaining portion of the
agreement was void under the Statute of Frauds. 10 9 Accordingly, the court
1
dismissed the action. 10
2. High School Athletics
The Tenth Circuit also considered similar issues involving a high school
football and wrestling coach, following his termination from both coaching
positions due to an ejection from a high school football game for alleged
misconduct. 111 As in Price, Kelly contended that his termination without
notice or hearing violated his rights to procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 12 However, because Kelly was subject to a teacher's
contract which required 30-days notice for termination, by failing to provide
notice or a hearing within that period, the court held that the school district had
violated Kelly's right to procedural due process. 113
Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered the termination of a coach who
brought a claim for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 114 The football coach had been employed by the high
school for over twenty years when his contract was not renewed. 115 At the
time of termination, the coach was fifty-four years old and was replaced by a
coach younger than age forty. 116 The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower
court's decision for the school district, determining that it erroneously refused

106. Price, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20160, at *3.
107. Id. at*12.
108. Id. at'*13-17.
109. Id. at *17-24.
110. Id. at *5.
111. See Kelly v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Nos. 02-6331 & 02-6339, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
21737, at *1, *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 23, 2003).
112. Id. at *5.
113. Id. at*13-14.
114. Kozlowski v. Hampton Sch. Bd., No. 02-1485, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 20226, at *1 (4th
Cir. Oct. 3, 2003).
115. Id. at *34.
116. Id. at *4.
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to instruct the jury that it could infer that age was the real reason for the
termination decision if it did not believe the justifications of the principal and
that the evidence presented by the coach undermined some of the principal's
117
justifications for termination.
B. Tort and Vicarious Liability
In 2003, courts decided multiple cases involving negligence and other
torts committed by coaches, but where the coaches were acting within the
scope of their responsibilities, the courts found them to be immune from
liability. In a Mississippi case concerning a student who suffered heatstroke
while at football practice, although a full hearing revealed that the student had
suffered damages amounting to $350,000 due to the school district's and
coach's negligence, the court affirmed a finding that both were immune from
liability under the Mississippi Torts Claims Act.11 8 The acts or omissions of
the football coach, performed within the scope of his employment as coach,
were discretionary and entitled to immunity. 119
In an Alabama case in which a boy was rendered a quadriplegic following
a wrestling maneuver with a coach, the court held that it could not determine,
as a matter of law, whether the coach's wrestling maneuver conformed to the
local and national wrestling guidelines and refused to grant state-agent
immunity to the coach. 120 Therefore, it reversed an earlier grant of summary
judgment in favor of the coach, remanding the case for determination on the
issue of liability.121 However, on the issue of whether the athletic director and
principal were negligent in failing to provide a qualified wrestling coach,
absent any evidence of bad faith or willful, malicious, or fraudulent acts, the
court found that the athletic director and principal were entitled to state-agent
22
immunity.1
However, immunity is not available for a coach when the coach has
committed gross negligence or an intentional tort. In a Virginia case involving
battery of, and injury to, a student football player by his coach at practice, the
court did not shield the coach from liability based on any assumption of risk
by the student of the dangers of football. 123 The coach asked the student to
117. Id. at* 14-29.
118. Harris v. McCray, No. 2001-CA-01627-SCT, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 553, at *1-2 (Miss. Oct.
23, 2003).
119. Id. at *16.
120. Giambrone v. Douglas, No. 1020234, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 226, at *1 (Ala. Aug. 1, 2003).
121. Id. at*27.
122. Id. at *25.
123. Koffman v. Garnett, 574 S.E.2d 258 (Va. 2003).
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"stand upright and motionless" to allow the coach to explain proper tackling
techniques. 124 He then lifted the player up and slammed him to the ground,
breaking his arm. 125 However, the court ruled that the coach's knowledge of
his size, his experience, the force applied, and his prior practice of not using
force to teach technique could lead a reasonable person to find that the coach
26
had been grossly negligent in acting with utter disregard for player safety.'
Similarly, although the player consented to the contact of playing football,
whether he consented to the particular type of bodily contact inherent in the
coach's conduct was a factual issue, which, like the question of gross
127
negligence, should be weighed by the jury.
VI. CONTRACTUAL ISSUES

Courts throughout the country have considered countless sports law cases
in the past year involving contractual issues. The following cases represent
some of the most interesting fact patterns and judicial decisions. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered a
tenuous attempt at an action for breach of an oral contract in Blackmon v.
Iverson.128 The defendant, NBA basketball player Allen Iverson, filed a
motion to dismiss the claims of the plaintiff, a family friend, who sought
damages for claims of breach of contract arising out of Iverson's use of "The
Answer" as a nickname and marketing tool.' 29 Blackmon alleged that he
suggested that Iverson use "The Answer" as a nickname one evening in 1994
before Iverson promised to pay, although Iverson did promise to pay
Blackmon later that same night. 130 Blackmon began working on marketing
for the nickname and was assured on multiple occasions that he would be paid
twenty-five percent of the earnings related to its use. 131 Disclosure of the
nickname idea occurred before Iverson told Blackmon that he was going to
use the idea in his 1996 shoe contract and before sales of products bearing
"The Answer" began in 1997.132 However, because disclosure of the
nickname idea had occurred before Iverson told Blackmon that he was going
to use the idea in his shoe contract, the court concluded that the disclosure was
124. Id. at 260.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 262.
127. Id.
128. No. 01-CV-6429, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6614, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2003).
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. at *34.
132. Id. at *4.
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past consideration insufficient to create a binding contract and accordingly
dismissed Blackmon's complaint. 133
The Connecticut Superior Court considered the assorted contractual issues
associated with the breakup of the Big East Conference in University of
Connecticut v. University of Miami.134 This matter arose due to Miami
University's decision to jump from the Big East Conference to membership in
the Atlantic Coast Conference. 135 Miami's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction was denied for a number of reasons. 136
First, the court held that the Big East Conference constitution was a contract
partially performed in Connecticut with the cause of action arising out of that
contract, making jurisdiction proper. 137 Additionally, the court properly
exercised personal jurisdiction over the University of Miami, as there was a
causal connection between Miami's contact with Connecticut through its
participation in athletic events within the state and the plaintiffs' injuries. 138
Finally, in Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New England Patriots,139 the court
considered a suit by a plaintiff ticket holder alleging breach of contract and
equitable estoppel. 140 The plaintiff sought specific performance of a season
ticket account as a contractual relationship. 14 1 The plaintiff had maintained a
season ticket package of six tickets for twenty years. 14 2 The tickets were
routinely distributed to employees and customers. 143 After a male customer
was arrested for using the women's restroom, the plaintiff was informed by the
team that all ticket privileges were being revoked. 144 The team emphasized
the relationship with the ticket holder as one of a revocable license instead of
contract. 14 5 The court also highly valued the public policy factor of deterring
unruly conduct in denying the plaintiffs application for an injunctive order. 146

133. Blackmon, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6614, at *28-29.
134. No. X07CV030081757S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2745, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 10,
2003).
135. See id. at *2.
136. Seeid. at*3-11.
137. Id. at *5.
138. Id.at *7-8.
139. No. 03-3832-E, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 274, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2003).
140. Id. at *6-7.
141. Id. at *7.
142. Id.at *2.
143. Id.
144. Yarde Metals, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 274, at *5-6.
145. Id. at *7-8.
146. Id.at *24-25.
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VII. CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES

In People v. Graziosa,147 the court considered a motion to set aside the

verdict after the defendant was convicted of third degree assault. 14 8 The case
involved an altercation in a diner between the defendant and David Wells, a
pitcher for the New York Yankees, in which the defendant broke two of the
victim's teeth. 149 Throughout the proceedings, Graziosa maintained a defense
of justification, alleging that he was not the instigator of the aggression, but
merely acted in self-defense to repel an assault by Wells. 150 The defendant
also argued that admission into evidence of testimony that he had been smiling
following his arrest and the prosecutor's reference to this testimony in
summation had been improper and would require a reversal as a matter of law
if raised on appeal. 15 1 However, the court disagreed with this contention and
denied the motion to set aside the verdict. It noted that although "a post-arrest
smile is generally inadmissible to establish consciousness of guilt because it
can convey many different states of mind and is therefore often ambiguous
and minimally probative[,]' 152 the facts of this case were distinguishable.
"Here, the evidence was unambiguous and highly probative of the defendant's
53
state of mind, a matter central to his asserted defense of justification.'
Rather than being merely testimony of an after-the-fact smile or a smile at
trial, the testimony admitted in this case "concerned the defendant's
continuous conduct before and during the incident and its uninterrupted
continuation following his arrest." 154 Therefore, this testimony was not
merely ambiguous proof of "consciousness of guilt."'1 55 In fact, it was direct
evidence that the defendant viewed the events as a source of amusement and
celebration.156 Accordingly, the motion to set aside the verdict was denied, as
the court ruled that the testimony had been properly admitted by the trial
court. 157

147. 756 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003).
148. Id. at 826.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 826-27.

152. Graziosa,756 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
153. Id. at 827.
154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Graziosa, 756 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
157. Id. at 829.
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VIII. DEFAMATION AND FREE SPEECH ISSUES

A variety of cases involving defamation and free speech issues were
decided by courts in 2003. In Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 158 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered a libel action brought by a high
school student athlete against the local newspaper. 159 The student athlete had
received awards as the state's top football player and also played in his team's
state championship basketball victory. 160 The newspaper reported that Wilson
had exposed himself to the opposing team's fans after the victory. 16 1 The
court determined that the overarching theme of the articles involved
sportsmanship rather than athletic ability. 162 It also reversed the lower court's
determination that the athlete was a public figure, therefore, needing to prove
that the newspaper acted with actual malice instead of negligence. 16 3 It held
that the newspaper did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
that the student was not a
athlete was a public figure. 164 Additionally, it noted
165
athlete.
an
was
he
because
simply
public figure
In a case involving similar issues, the Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that a
former high school football coach was a public figure, and therefore, needed to
prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. 166 The coach sought
damages for defamation allegedly leading to his termination as high school
football coach.1 67 Because issues of material fact remained as to the existence
judgment on this
of actual malice, the court reversed the grant of summary
68
proceedings.
further
for
case
the
issue and remanded
Finally, the Supreme Court of Hawaii considered an interesting First
Amendment issue involving a student manager for an intercollegiate
basketball team. 169 The student manager for the University of Hawaii men's
basketball team was sued, along with the university, by one of the team's fans,

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
2003).

588 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
at 200-201.
Id. at 202.
Wilson, 588 S.E.2d at 203-08.
Id.at 209.
Id.
Myers v. Levy, No. 2-02-1334, 2003 II. App. LEXIS 1399, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 1,

167. Id. at*l1-5.

168. Id. at *23.
169. State v. Hoshijo, 76 P.3d 550 (Haw. 2003).
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alleging racial discrimination. 170 The student manager had yelled and
threatened the fan using racial slurs during the final minutes of a basketball
game in 1995.171 The manager's conduct was regulated by a university
handbook, and he received an athletic scholarship from the university. 172 The
court held that the university was liable for the acts of the manager because he
was an agent by virtue of the handbook and scholarship, and therefore, was
acting within the scope of his position as manager when the remarks were
made. 173 Additionally, the court held that the manager's comments were not
74
protected by the First Amendment because they constituted fighting words. 1
IX. DRUG TESTING

ISSUES

Numerous courts have addressed issues involving drug testing policies of
athletes in the past year. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas decided two related matters. 175 Each arose out of challenges
to the constitutionality of a drug testing policy that applied only to student
athletes. 176 In the first decision, the student's father alleged that officials
performed a drug test on his son after he had withdrawn his consent and that
the policy was instituted with racial bias in violation of equal protection
guarantees. 177 The court granted summary judgment for the school district,
finding that the policy was not unconstitutional as written and that Bean had
failed to meet his burden, stating only conclusions, subjective belief, and
78
hearsay.1
Bean also brought a civil rights action against the lab worker who tested
his son's sample, claiming that the worker conducted an unreasonable search
in collecting the urine sample. 179 The court noted, however, that even if the
drug testing policy violated constitutional principles, it was not alleged that the
180
lab worker deviated from the standards and procedures of the policy.

170. Id. at 552-53.
171. Id. at 554.
172. Id. at 552.
173. Id. at 561-62.
174. Hoshijo, 76 P.3d at 564-65.
175. Bean v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist.., No. 2:01-CV-394-J, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14617, at *1
(N.D. Tex., Aug. 22, 2003); Bean v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:01-CV-0394-J, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 220, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2003).
176. See id.
177. Bean, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14167, at *2-3.
178. Id. at*6-10.
179. Bean, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220, at *2-3.
180. Id. at *6.
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Accordingly, there were insufficient allegations against the lab worker to
support the action, and summary judgment was granted in his favor. 181
In New Jersey, the state supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a
random drug and alcohol testing program of the school district that applied to
all students participating in both athletic and non-athletic extracurricular
activities, as well as students who possessed school parking permits. 182 The
court reversed the trial court's finding that the policy violated the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New Jersey
constitution. 183 The court stated that the students' expectations of privacy
were reduced in a public-school setting; the degree of obtrusiveness was
minimal because the manner in which the urine testing was done limited the
intrusion on students' privacy and protected their personal dignity; and the
need for conducting the testing in order to attempt to reduce the major drug
84
problem in schools was strong. 1
In another challenge to a school drug testing policy in Texas, the court
considered an argument that the policy violated constitutional protections of
freedom of religion. 185 Like a growing number of other drug and alcohol
testing policies, the school district's policy applied to all students participating
in extracurricular activities. 18 6 In this case, the students were Jewish and
drank wine as part of their religion.187 The appellate court held that the policy
did not violate the Texas constitution because the policy applied to every
junior high and high school student participating in extracurricular activities
and because it was facially neutral regarding religion. 18 8 Additionally, the
court upheld the policy because there is no fundamental right to participate in
extracurricular activities, the policy was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest in student welfare, and students have a lessened expectation of privacy
89
in the public school setting. 1
X. GENDER EQUITY AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION ISSUES
Numerous courts considered cases in 2003 involving gender equity or
181. Id. at *7.
182. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624 (N.J. 2003).
183. See id. at 626-27.
184. See generally id.
185. Marble Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Shell, No. 03-02-00693-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2845,
at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 3, 2003).
186. Id. at *2-3.
187. Id. at *3.
188. Id. at *9.
189. Id. at 16-18.
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gender discrimination issues under either Title IX or Title VII.
A. Title IX
190
In National Wrestling Coaches Ass 'n v. U.S. Department of Education,
the court considered claims that the enforcement policies of the Department of
Education caused institutions to cut men's sports teams, artificially limit the
number of participants on men's teams, discriminate against men, and deny
male athletes equal protection under the law. 19 1 The court dismissed the
action because the associations failed to meet their burden of proof on whether
192
they were the proper parties to bring this action.
In November, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered a claim filed by eight student gymnasts against the
University of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of Title IX.193 The court found
that the institution failed to provide equal coaching services to male and
female student athletes and failed to pay coaches of women's teams the same
salaries as coaches of men's teams. 194 It ordered the school to immediately
reinstate women's gymnastics as a fully-funded intercollegiate athletic team,
provide a coaching staff for that team, provide funding in an amount equal to
or greater than previously provided, and provide adequate facilities and
95
equipment necessary for the team to compete. 1
In December, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled
that plaintiff high school girls' hockey players had not satisfied their burden in
attempting to show that the site for the girls' hockey tournament was not
substantially equal to or a comparable facility to the arena hosting the boys'
tournament, and accordingly denied the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive
relief. 196

B. Title VII
In April, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona considered a
suit against the universities and state colleges of Arizona alleging gender

190. 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003).
191. Id. at 85.
192. Id. at 129-30.
193. Barrett v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa., No. 03-CV-4978, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21095, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2003).
194. lid. at *51.
195. Id.
196. Mason v. Minn. State High Sch. League, No. 03-6462, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23460, at *1
(D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2003).
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based discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 19 7 The
plaintiff failed to show that his job and his co-worker's job were substantially
equal in skill, effort, and responsibility under the Equal Pay Act. 19 8 However,
Lewis did establish a case under Title VII by showing that he was given
199
greater or similar responsibilities for less pay.
In July, the Third Circuit considered a reverse gender discrimination case
filed by a job applicant under Title VII. 200 A male applicant for a women's
crew coaching position sued the university when he was not hired or
interviewed. 20 1 The court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff
because the evidence sufficiently supported the rejection of the university's
20 2
stated reason for hiring a woman over the plaintiff.
Also in July, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Title VII gender discrimination
and retaliation claim of an assistant coach against the University of Cincinnati
because the plaintiff failed to establish that she was qualified for her position
because she routinely failed to meet the institution's expectations after being
20 3
hired or to show that she was treated worse than a similarly situated male.
XI. HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION ISSUES
A. FederalCourtIssues
In January, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
decided an extremely important case on remand from the Sixth Circuit.20 4 The
case arose after the association penalized the school for violating its recruiting
rule by sending a spring practice letter to all incoming ninth grade students and
following the letters with phone calls. 20 5 The court held that the recruiting
rule was not narrowly tailored to meet the association's substantial interests as
a state actor. 20 6 It held that the letter and phone calls did not threaten any
harm to any of the association's legitimate interests as a state actor, but instead

197. Lewis v. Smith, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1055-56 (D. Ariz. 2003).
198. See id. at 1058-60.
199. Id. at 1060-63.
200. Medcalfv. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 71 Fed. Appx. 924 (3d. Cir. July 30, 2003).
201. Id. at 925.
202. Id. at 933.
203. See Murphy v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 72 Fed. Appx. 288 (6th Cir. July 29, 2003).
204. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, No. 3:97-1249, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24769, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2003).
205. Id. at* 12-13.
206. Id. at *36-38.
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represented harmless informational speech about
20 8
Therefore, the recruiting rule was unconstitutional.

athletic

practice. 20 7

B. State Court Issues
In Michigan, the court of appeals held that the Michigan High School
Athletic Association was not a public body for purposes of the Freedom of
Information Act because it was not primarily funded through government
created based on government authority, as
not
authority and because it was 20
9
Law.
Michigan
under
required
In Colorado, the court of appeals considered a claim by a high school
wrestling coach against the Colorado High School Activities Association,
alleging the taking of a vested property right following sanctions levied
against him. 2 10 The court held that, although the coach had a vested property
right in his employment, the association did not deprive him of that right,
because the association was not his employer, and therefore, had no
contractual relationship with him. 2 11 It also found that the association did not
deprive the coach of a protected liberty interest by failing to provide prompt
review because mere reputational injury or alleged future harm was not
2 12
sufficient.
XII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
In 2003, courts considered a variety of sports cases involving copyright or
trademark law.
A. CopyrightIssues
In September, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota considered a claim of copyright infringement arising from a credit
card company's advertising campaign. 2 13 The plaintiffs, wanting to keep
Major League Baseball in Minnesota, produced a videotape showing them
traveling to major league cities with urban stadiums, for which they obtained a

207. Id. at *38-39.
208. Id. at *41.
209. Breighner v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 662 N.W.2d 413, 419-21 (Mich Ct.
App. 2003).
210. Babi v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 77 P.3d 916, 919 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
211. Id. at 920-21.
212. Id. at 920-22.
213. Hoch v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Minn. 2003).
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copyright in 2001.214 After the defendants began airing advertisements in its
"Priceless" campaign showing two people traveling to baseball stadiums and
paying for their expenses with credit cards, the plaintiffs brought this
action. 2 15 Summary judgment was granted for the defendants because of a
lack of direct evidence of copyright infringement, because the plaintiffs could
not produce enough circumstantial evidence to show that the advertising
agency had access to their tape, and because the ads were not substantially
2 16
similar to the copyright owners' tape.
B. Trademark and CybersquattingIssues
In June, the Sixth Circuit considered a trademark infringement claim
associated with an artist's prints of a painting of Tiger Woods. 2 17 The court
found that a claim for violation of a registered mark was barred by the fair use
defense and further held that a person's image or likeness could not function
2 18
as a trademark.
In August, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
decided a case concerning the validity of the phrase "march madness" as a
trademark. 2 19 The court found that, based on survey evidence and expert
testimony, "march madness" was a protectable mark because it was a
descriptive term that had acquired secondary meaning. 220 The court also
found a strong likelihood of confusion because the phrase was a strong mark
in the basketball context, the domain name was identical to the mark, and the
22 1
website and the mark sought business from the same customers.
Additionally, use of the domain name was not fair use according to the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act because the defendants did not have
222
reasonable grounds to believe that their use of the phrase was fair use.
In September, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
considered a challenge to the existing marks of the Washington Redskins of
223
the National Football League through a trademark cancellation proceeding.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id. at 1220-24.
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
218. Id. at 920-21.
219. March Madness Athletic Ass'n v. Netfire, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-398-R, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14941, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2003).
220. Id. at *45-48.
221. Id. at*49-53.
222. Id. at *78-84.
223. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
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The team challenged the decision of the Trial Trademark and Appeal Board
(TTAB) canceling six of its trademark registrations because the TTAB found
that the marks disparage Native Americans. 224 The court granted summary
judgment for the team, finding that the TTAB did not have substantial
evidence to support its conclusion that the marks were disparaging to a
when used in connection with the
substantial composite of Native Americans
22 5
services.
entertainment
football
team's
Finally, in December, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington considered a claim of trademark infringement arising
out of ESPN's "Playmakers" series. 226 The plaintiff sports agency alleged that
there was a likelihood of confusion between use of the mark in association
with the television series and the agency's use of the mark in association with
its sports agency services. 2 27 The agency also raised concerns about negative
22 8
associations with the mark due to the controversial content of the series.
However, the court refused to recognize tarnishment as a new factor in the
analysis of a trademark claim. 229 It ultimately denied the motion for
injunction, finding no likelihood of confusion, based on the visual differences
by the parties, and the
of the marks, the differences in services provided
23 0
differences in the marketing channels utilized.
XIII. LABOR LAW ISSUES

Various courts also considered sports labor law issues during 2003. In
East Coast Hockey League, Inc. v. ProfessionalHockey Players Ass 'n., 23 1 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether disputes between the hockey league and the
players association were subject to the arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between them. 232 "Article XII of the CBA
contained a grievance and arbitration procedure for resol[ving] disputes
between the parties." 2 33 The provision states:
Any dispute, controversy, claim or disagreements (1) arising out of or
relating to this Agreement; (2) arising out of or related to the [League]
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.at 99.
Id.at 144-45.
Playmakers, LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
Id.at 1278-79.
See id.
at 1283-85.
Id.at 1284-85.
Id.at 1285-86.
322 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at313.
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Standard Player's Contract or any alleged breach thereof; (3) arising
out of or relating to any term or condition of a Player's employment;
(4) arising out of or related to the [Association]; and/or (5) arising out
of or related to a Player and any other [League] Club and/or the
234
[League] shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration ....
Two disputes were at issue before the court. The first dispute, the
"Tallahassee dispute," was between a club and the association involving the
league's salary cap. 23 5 The second dispute, the "Sugden dispute," concerned
the lifetime suspension of a player by the league for throwing a stick at a
patron. 2 36 The league rejected the Association's demands for arbitration on
either dispute, contending that neither dispute was subject to the arbitration
provision. 237 The court noted that it must "uphold a claim that a dispute is
subject to arbitration 'unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute."' 238 However, it did not find that the arbitration provision could not
apply to either dispute. 239 It stated that "clearly, a violation of a salary cap is a
breach of the CBA... [and thus], the arbitration provision of the CBA must
' 240
be applied as written and the Tallahassee dispute is subject to arbitration."
Similarly, because the association did not challenge the league president's
power to suspend a player, the court saw no "inconsistency in the president
being given the 'sole discretion' to make a decision and that exercise of
discretion being reviewable." 24 1 Accordingly, because the clarity of the
arbitration provision in stating that any dispute "arising out of or related to any
term or condition of a Player's employment.., shall be submitted to final and
binding arbitration" could hardly be questioned, the Fourth Circuit held that
the magistrate-judge erred in his decision and should have granted summary
judgment in favor of the Association. 242 It therefore reversed the decision and
remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the
Association, declaring that the disputes are subject to the arbitration provision

234. Id.
235. Id.at313-14.
236.
237.
238.
650).
239.

322 F.3d at 314.
Id.
Id.at 314-15 (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. at
Id.at 315-16.

240. Id.
241. East Coast Hockey, 322 F.3d at 316.
242. Id.
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243
found in the CBA.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
considered a similar factual situation in Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball v. World Umpires Ass 'n. 244 This case concerned a dispute between
the employer and union over a warning letter sent to umpire John Hirschbeck,
president of the World Umpires Association, related to his conduct in recent
games. 245 The plaintiffs maintained that the union's grievance was not
arbitrable pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
because the underlying disputes involved discipline of an employee that
required application of dispute resolution procedures. 24 6 However, the union
argued that the dispute was a grievance under the CBA that required
arbitration. 24 7 Disputes related to discipline or termination of umpires are
governed exclusively by Article 10 of the CBA, which states:
The procedures and remedies, if any, that are set out in this Article 10
shall be the sole and exclusive means available to an umpire (and to
the Union) to challenge any decision by the Office of the

Commissioner to discipline, or to terminate ...the employment of an
248

umpire.
The union relied on Article 23 of the CBA, which permits "third-party
arbitration of 'grievances' that are not resolved informally. 'Grievance' is
defined as: 'any dispute or disagreement involving the interpretation or
application of any provision of this Agreement.'"249 However, the court stated
that, although Article 23 does allow for arbitration of "certain matters
involving a 'rule, policy, directive or instruction issued by the Office of the
Commissioner...' the union's grievance does not challenge a 'policy,
directive, or instruction."' 250 Rather, the grievance challenges a disciplinary
letter to an individual umpire for specific conduct, thus falling directly within
the confines of disputes subject to dispute resolution procedures spelled out in
Article 10 of the CBA. 25 1 Accordingly, the union's dispute was not subject to
2 52
arbitration and summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer.
243. Id.
244. 242 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
245. Id. at 382-83.
246. Id. at 381-82.
247. Id. at 383.
248. Id. at 382.
249. World UmpiresAss'n, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
250. Id.at 387.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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XIV. SPORTS OFFICIALS ISSUES

In a Title VII case involving an intercollegiate baseball umpire, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a
plaintiff's suit against the defendant athletic conference was not proper, as the
umpire was an independent contractor and not an employee of the
conference. 253 The umpire brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and the
New York Human Rights Law § 296, alleging that the conference had
discriminated against him based on his race. 254 However, although the
conference provided umpires for its games, coordinated schedules, assigned
umpires to games, approved travel expenses for umpires, provided a dress
code, and evaluated umpires' abilities, the conference did not employ the
umpires because it did not pay them or reimburse travel expenses. 255 Without
the key factor of payment creating an employment relationship, the court
found that the umpire was an independent contractor who was not covered by
Title VII or the New York Human Rights law, and therefore, granted summary
256
judgment for the conference.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana also
considered a case involving a sports official, although this time involving a
tort issue. 2 57 In this case, the plaintiff, a high school basketball referee,
brought a suit against the defendant school, a player's parent, and three other
individuals for injuries suffered while working a basketball game. 258 The
plaintiff and a fellow referee were attacked by the defendants after a player
was ejected from the game because of a technical foul. 2 59 The defendant
parent moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to
allege that the parent personally punched, kicked, or clawed him. 260 However,
the court denied the motion because the defendant's actions occurred at a high
school sports event where the plaintiff was responsible for officiating and
keeping order and because the defendant failed to establish that he owed no
duty to the plaintiff to refrain from coming onto the basketball court and

253. Wadler v. E. Coll. Athletic Conference, No. 00 Civ. 5671 (JSM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14212, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2003).
254. Id.
255. Id. at *3.
256. Id. at *7-10.
257. Brantley v. Bowling Green Sch., No. 03-173, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20070, at *1 (E.D. La.
Nov. 3, 2003).
258. Id. at *2.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *2-3.
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26 1
assaulting any person.

XV. STADIUM ISSUES

In February, the Illinois Supreme Court decided a case brought by parks
groups and members alleging a violation of the public trust doctrine in the
262
renovation of Chicago's Soldier Field to accommodate the Chicago Bears.
The court was required to defer to the legislative findings of the Illinois Sports
Facilities Authority Act unless there was a showing by the plaintiffs that those
findings were evasive and that the Act's purpose was primarily to benefit
private interests. 263 The court found that, although the Bears would benefit
from this project, the facility would remain a public one owned and operated
by the park district.2 64 Additionally, given the stadium's long history of
hosting events that provided benefits to private groups, there was no evidence
of evasiveness in the findings. 265 Therefore, the court upheld the lower
266
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
In November, the Seventh Circuit decided a case concerning the recurring
problem of ticket scalping. In Arlotta v. Bradley Center,267 Arlotta had been
arrested for scalping tickets and sued the Bradley Center and the city of
Milwaukee, alleging false arrest, illegal confinement, and malicious
prosecution. 2 68 The Bradley Center had enlisted the city police department to
help fight the scalping problem by having plainclothes and uniformed officers
arrest and detain scalpers. 2 69 The court found that the fact that Arlotta did not
assert that others had been wrongfully arrested was strong evidence that the
anti-scalper plan actually worked and the arrest was not due to a problem with
2 70
the policy but due to the fact that Arlotta violated the policy.
XVI. TAXATION ISSUES
In PhiladelphiaEagles Football Club, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,27 1 the

261. Id. at *4-5.
262. Friends of the Parks, v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. 2003).
263. Id. at 165-69.
264. Id. at 168-69.
265. Id. at 167.
266. Id. at 171.
267. 349 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2003).
268. Id. at 521.
269. Id. at 520-21.
270. Id. at 522-24.
271. 823 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2003).
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272
court considered a case involving taxation of the team's media receipts.
The team shared a percentage of revenues received by the league from its
contracts with television networks for broadcasting of league football
games. 2 73 The lower court properly held that the city's Business Privilege Tax
(BPT) 274 applied to these media receipts, but violated the commerce clause's
apportionment requirement by applying the tax to 100% of the receipts when
only 50% of the games were played in the city. 275 The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment that 100% of the receipts were subject to the BPT and
2 76
remanded the case.

Additionally, in Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 2 7 7 the Illinois

Court of Appeals reversed a finding that a tax was properly imposed on
admission to a charitable golf tournament because the plaintiffs presented
undisputed facts showing that each year the net proceeds from the golf
tournament were distributed to charities, there was no evidence that anyone
had been operating the golf tournament for personal profit, and the statements
of the sponsors illustrated the intent to use the property exclusively for
2 78
charitable purposes.
XVII. TORT ISSUES
During 2003, a multitude of courts considered tort actions brought by
injured participants or spectators at sporting events and locations.
A. ParticipantInjury Cases in FederalCourts
In Bresnahan v. Bowen,2 79 the United States District Court for the District
of Maine considered a negligence action arising out of a collision between two
skiers on a ski slope. 280 The injured plaintiff asserted that the defendant was
skiing too fast, beyond the scope of his ability, and out of control. 28 1 The
plaintiff further alleged that the defendant failed to yield to the plaintiff as the

272. Id.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 113.
See id.
Phila.Eagles FootballClub, 823 A.2d at 135-136.
785 N.E.2d 1031 (Il. App. Ct. 2003).

278. See id.
279. 263 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Me. 2003).
280. Id.
281.

Id. at 134.
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downhill skier and was thus liable for damages. 282 The defendant countered
283
by asserting two affirmative defenses.
First, the defendant argued that by signing release forms with the ski
school and ski resort without expressly reserving the right to sue the
defendant, the plaintiff had waived her negligence claims. 2 84 The defendant
had signed identical releases with the ski resort. 285 However, the court noted
that the fact that each party had signed an identical release with the resort did
not create a contract between them, nor was it possible to find that the
28 6
defendant was an immediate party to the plaintiffs release with the resort.
Second, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had expressly assumed the
risk of colliding with other skiers by signing the releases and was thus barred
from bringing a negligence claim. 287 However, once again, the defendant
could not prevail on this defense when the signed release was between the
plaintiff and the resort, not the plaintiff and the defendant. 288 Accordingly, the
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's
2 89
negligence claims.
In Umali v. Mount Snow Ltd.,290 the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont decided a case in which a participant sued the defendants
for gross negligence, willful and wanton acts, and omissions in the
construction of a dual slalom bicycle race course. 29 1 The plaintiff was injured
292
while participating in the defendant's dual slalom mountain bicycle race.
The plaintiff was a novice dual slalom bike racer and signed several
application forms, each containing releases and waivers pertaining to events
organized by the defendants. 293 The plaintiff was injured badly when he
landed headfirst against a double jump, leaving him a paraplegic. 294 The court
held that the releases signed by the contestant were void as against public
policy by releasing the defendants from liability for negligence. 295 The court
282. Id.
283. Id. at 135.
284. Bresnahan,263 F. Supp. 2d at 135-36.
285. Id. at 133-36.
286. Id. at 135-36.
287. Id. at 136-37.
288. Id.
289. Bresnahan,263 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
290. 247 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Vt. 2003).
291. Id. at 568.
292. Id. at 568-69.
293. Id. at 569.
294. Id. at 570.
295.

Umali, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 272-75.
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cited Vermont Supreme Court precedent declaring "it is simply wrong to put
296
one party to a contract at the mercy of the other's negligence."
Additionally, because experts testified, "the dangerous condition of the track
and jump was neither an obvious risk nor a necessary one[,] ' 297 summary
judgment for the defendant was inappropriate under the Vermont Sports Injury
statute, 298 as a material issue of fact remained.
B. ParticipantInjury Cases in State Courts
In a unique attempt at a negligence claim, the Illinois Court of Appeals
considered a case in which a plaintiff was injured by an errant shot on a golf
course. 299 The injured plaintiff alleged that the defendant did not properly
swing his club and was careless and negligent in making his shot. 300 In
assessing this unusual claim, the court found no evidence of anything more
than a bad golf shot, recognizing risks inherent to the game of golf and the
assumption of those risks. 30 1 It thus upheld the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant golfer on the allegations that he
30 2
did not properly swing the club.
C. SpectatorInjury Cases
In 2003, courts considered a plethora of cases brought by plaintiffs injured
by foul balls or errantly thrown balls at baseball games across the country.
These cases have generally been decided in favor of the defendants under a
theory of assumption of inherent risk associated with the game of baseball.
The Virginia Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant baseball clubs in an action brought by a woman seriously injured
when struck by a foul ball, recognizing that warning signs alerting spectators
to the danger of batted balls were posted at the entrances to seating areas and
that the back of each ticket contained a statement that the holder of the ticket
assumed the risk of being injured by a batted ball. 30 3 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reached a similar decision when faced with nearly identical facts in

296. Id. at 573.
297. Id. at 575.
298. Id. (citing Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1037).
299. Heiden v. Cummings, 786 N.E.2d 240 (111.App. Ct. 2003).
300. Id. at 241.
301. Id. at 242-43.
302. Id.
303. Thurmond v. Prince William Prof I Baseball Club, 574 S.E.2d 246, 246-47 (Va. 2003).
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Alwin v. St. Paul Saints Baseball Club, Inc.304 In an analogous scenario in
New York, the court considered a claim by an injured party, alleging that the
defendants were negligent in failing to provide proper protection to spectators
at the stadium. 30 5 The court held that by providing sufficient protective
netting behind home plate where the danger of being struck by a baseball was
greatest, the defendants had fulfilled their duty of care and could not be held
30 6
liable for negligence.
Brent C. Moberg

304. 672 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
305. Ray v. Hudson Valley Stadium Corp., 306 A.D.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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